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HEARING ON GENETIC ENGINEERING:
BENEFITS
AND POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS
Tuesday, December 1, 1981
Sacramento, California

CHAIRMAN ART TORRES:

Over the years, new genetic

technologies have been developed that allow researchers the ability
characteristics of micro-organisms.

to manipulate the

These techniques are referred to as gene splicing or more correctly
genetic engineering.

Products such as bio-synthetic insulin,

erferon and human growth hormone, developed by genetic engineering, illustrate that laboratory techniques once considered experimental now have practical application.

Genetic engineering is no

longer just a laboratory exercise,but is now a major tool of science
with vast industrial applications.

Projections for the pharmaceuti-

cal industry alone indicate a $3 billion United States market for
recombinant DNA products by 1990.
Although no evidence exists that any harmful organism
has ever been created by genetic engineering, most experts believe
that some risk is associated with its activities.
poss

Because of the

ity of these risks, the National Institute of Health has

prohibited certain recombinant DNA experiments and restricted others.
The issue of whether to regulate genetic engineering and
so, to what extent, defies, ln my opinion, a simple solution.
Today~~~a\LelJ

though

-=the_

physical risks of DNl\ research are genel'ally

considered to be less than originally feared, it is appropriate at
s time, I believe, in California to review these activities to
determine whether state regulation is required to prevent what may

be a major potential health hazard.
Today's

be devoted to

engineering and how industry is ut

about

iz

We will also hear testimony on the proposed
the nature of genet

eng

act

and,

e

tate

California.
I'd like to call on our
Rutter, who is

Dr. \A]i l

of the

of California at San Francisco, who'
of genet

go

to

engineering and current research

Dr. Rutter.

He's busily

All

like to then call upon Mr. Tom
here?
Eli
well.

Please come forward.

Genentech, Inc.

Dr. Irv

lly Research

Pres
come forward

s

And Dr. Herbert

s

of B

s

at Hoffman-LaRoche, would you

eas

here and we'll
MR. TOM KILEY:
I'm Tom

V

Genentech

Mr.

Pres

a Cal

Genentech.
company

DNA techno
to, was

for

to the public the benef

a human hormone.
States the then Sc ences

c

In
s

led that

1978 came human

9

-2-

the products of Genentech researchers.

Thymosin Alpha l, which is

in, an intermediate form of
, bovine and porcine
iency in meat and milk productt

later resulted from Genentech researchers.

More recently we've

1on of human calcitonin which is

announced the

use 1n the treatment of

substance of potent

a

's Disease,

possibly one that may prove useful in the treatment of senile bone
embrittlement as wel

This year the Secretary of Agriculture

announced that, as a result of a scient

collaborat

between

USDA and Genentech, bacteria had produced a vaccine for foot-mouth
sease which is a disease of very substantial dimensions outside
the United States.

Just a few weeks ago we announced the production

by microbial means of human serum albumen which is a blood expander,
the major component of human blood and a substance currently in use
for the treatment of shock and traumatic injury.
Genentech has received more approvals for seal
ion of recombinant DNA products from the National Institutes
of Health than all other companies in the world combined.
growing company.

Formed 1n 1976, not more than a dozen employees

when human insul

resulted from our researchers.

320 and are continuing to grow.
Genentech has a Ph.D.
300 square feet.

Today we number

One in every five employees of

In 1976 the company's facilities occupied

By year end our research deve

development facilit

ss

s will encompass some 144,000 square feet here

in California with more under construction.

We have invested in

excess of $3 million in capital investment, $20 mil
alone.

We are a

on in this year

Our research expenditures for the current year will total
-3-

near $17 million.

Although a smal

company

we're

more

research and development in health and related areas than the

.J. He

Mallinckrodt or Rorer in pharmaceuticals or

or S.

~1ark

in the food processing industry.
We were the first of the new

s to prov

practical benefit from the new

Here the

new companies forming around

to

bility of public ownership.

It

company to

pharmaceutical product of this sc

co laborat

ll be

, and

notes on human

hormone.

ll

l

hormone for the treatment

In the past, human

hypopituitary dwarfism or growth hormone def
could be

Dr.

led
to

later testimony, Dr. Weissbach
confine myself to a few

erferon
fman-LaRoche; others

fr

The insulin case

our

of

ly, two

our

, four

the treatment of dwarfism in

diabetic treatment

collaboration
will follow.

present t

advanced human c

Human growth hormone

partners in research, E

on the market

To

products of our researches are

children, insulin

spons

to be seen Hhether

or Eli Lilly will become the

testing.

the

s ln

l

human

excess of 50

took

pituitaries derived from cadavers
treat one child for one year.

to
le s than al

United States requiring treatment could aeecss the material.
po s

Although preliminary indications suggest
hormone

u

(3.

u ()

_L

cholest

healing, osteoporosis or senile bone
bone fracture knitting, unti

l

the pres
-4-

t

has never

been a sufficient quant

of that material for detailed testing.

Now that will happen as well.
ttuman cl

cal

growth hormone.

rials in the

~enentech

itself is conducting the

ed States with regard to human

Elsewhere in the world our partner in that research,

Kabivitrum, hitherto the world's largest supplier of the pituitary
ved material, lS conducting cl

cal trials calculated to PDen

up the product to the availability of children around the world.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

How widespread would you consider the

dwarfism problem to be in this country?
MR. KILEY:

It is by pharmaceutical industry standards

a relatively small market and one therefore nice
\;enentech's present means.

adapted to

The far more economically significant

aspects of human growth hormone will come when and if other indications are opened up; but to a parent whose child suffers from
hypopituitary dwarfism, the illness is a great problem indeed.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

What timetable do you perceive that a

pharmaceutical type approach would be available in this country?
MR. KILEY:

Of course, that rests entire

ln the hands cf

the Food and Drug Administration, but optimistically it's possible
that the product could become available as early as late 1983.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

When you indicated that human studies

are being done now, what is the nature and the success rate of those
studies?

How have they been conducted?
MR. KILEY:

part

Well, speaking first as a human subject who

the Phase I clinical studies, I can say and offer

myself as evidence that the product was judged as sufficiently safe to
go into the next stage of testing in children; and in a number of
medical centers around the country, children are now receiving the
-5-

material in so-called Phase II,

well prove

the final phase of test
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
MR. KILEY:

All

At a time when act

e

st Dracon
federal legislation, there was, I

, a need

and small companies like Genentech
universit

, principally those

role in the development of

s

8

to my left doubtless will disagree,

be

may

v

was the small companies
concerns into 20th
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

seem to

DR. IRVING S. JOHNSON:
MR. KILEY:
concerns over

We

No

don

we

cone

evidence has suggested that we were
stence

s

concerns who e
could,

combination
s of

of the
willing
Minerals and

t

tted our company

has
1

as a ful
at the cutt

enroute to
int

our

atta

ed
e of

your assert

e

ohazard vJer

ourselves

fore

molecular'

s exc
-6-

well.

lon of our business is
centered around the

ing needs of the company aimed at becoming

a fully integrated organization.

We're hiring pharmacologists and

marketing and manufacturing people, process development engineers,
enzymologists, microbiologists, molecular biologists, organic
sts at a furious rate because of our intention to become a
ful

integrated company.
We have from the first concerned ourself

the

le~aJ

and

related issues arising around the potential applications of genetic
engineering.

We played a key role in the Supreme Court's considera-

tion of the question whether patents could

sue on new microorganisms.

We have cooperated with the National Institutes of Safety and
Health in their on-going consideration of the question of worker
safety ln the area.

We have the same interest that you do because

we live in the same state you do and proceeding with all the caution
that prudent action requires.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

What does all that means?

That sounds

very nice, but what does all that mean ln very practical terms?
What do we tell the public who is confused about genetic engineering
and its implications?

What kinds of safeguards and cautions can

you publicly give to a Legislature and to its people here in this
state that those fears or those doubts or that confusion is not well
founded?

direction of our Board, we have complied voluntarily with the guidelines for recombinant DNA research of the National Institutes of
Health.

Our Director of Manufacturing formerly participated in the

design of Eli Lilly's plant for biosynthetic insulin and brings to
-7-

us

concern

the
can

over
much
work and

a
s

b

can
that
should

sc

one

1

('

substitute state regulation for the federal regulation that
ly is recognized as unnecessary.

I'm reminded of a

letter written by Professor Stanley Cohen of Stanford University to
Congressman Staggers at a time in 1977 when legislation was under
consideration in Congress to impose the most stringent regulation
on this industry, legislation that I think might well have stifled
much of the creative work that has come since.

He quoted in that

letter some comments by James Watson, the Nobel laureate of Watson
and Crick

fame on prospects for federal regulation of biological

science, and I would like briefly to read Dr. Watson's remarks:
"We suffer,"he said, "from the results of a massive miscalculation
in which we cried wolf without ever having seen or heard one.
Legislation has been proposed to establish an extensive regulatory
apparatus to control basic scientific research in an area where
there is not one shred of evidence to support the view that special
risks exist or special controls are needed.

For recombinant DNA, a

costly and cumbersome bureaucracy is proposed to govern the content
and methods of scientific inquiry 1n the absence of any indication
whatsoever of actual hazard or of any scientific evidence to even
suggest that a substantial threat to the public health and welfare
exists."

If we are to learn anything from the precedent of govern-

ment- de-re.e;ulat-ion at the

level, if a vital, young, new

industry that was born in California is to flourish in California
and if the cornucopia is to be permitted to continue unfolding
products of incalculable value, then I think we should recognize two
important needs.

First, the government of California should continue

the process this committee has begun to watch carefully over the
birth of a new and vital industry and to insure that only good things
-9-

come of

s

we should
sugge ts
do that
further
than to cause
t

the

CHAI
DR.
Johnson. I m a

is a

s

t
cosmetic
l

and Vi

Elanco.
med

0

state,
grown

I'd

to address myself to four

l

to comment brief

I'd l

I'd l

about what we're doing in genetic engineer-

to tell you a little
ing.

s.

on the benefits that I think it

icularly in agriculture, and about safety and a matter

may have,

of international economic competition.
has

As Tom Ki

ic human insulin, and we are in very

ion of

the

of this material, both the United States

scale cl

•

mentioned to you, we are involved

and in Europe.

from Genentech may have more approvals

While my

for large-scale production, we had the first one; and I'd like to tell
you a little bit about why we went into the production of human insulin.
company

We were the

the world to bring insulin to the dia-

betic, and we've always felt a special relationship to the diabetic
population, and we did this in the 1920's.

What we perceived

this

field was the fact that we were tied to a by-product of the meat
industry.

The animals are not raised for their glands.

sed as food, and the supply
while the requirements
rate.

pancreas glands was fairly static

insulin were increasing at a more rapid

And in fact, the diabet

population

rate than the population as a whole.

rap

when these 1

They're

lS

increasing at a more

You could argue about

s of requirements and supply cross, but they clearly

were going to cross, and our prediction is that they will probably
the 1990's, and at that time there will be a shortage of

cross
ln.
a rel

Genetic engineering clearly gave us an opportunity to have
le, controllable source of insulin for diabetics which could

be expanded or contracted as the demand indicated.

At the same time,

we believe there are significant advantages to this material.

It is,

of course, the insulin that occurs in the body, and we have produced
s in two forms.

We've produced it by combining the A and B chains of

-11-

insulin, and we've produced
proinsul

which

by

a precursor mo

that proinsulin is secreted
circulating.

the

One of the

in the last decade or so is that
for a few very

molecules

logically and bio

cal

ment therapy that

act
s have

to the animal

are

but the pro
Proinsulin

--they're not
lS

substitute therapy,
available, and we believe that
therapeutic role
normal l

s own

span, still hav

have,

e

vascular
go

l

that out
s.

We

time that says that the

large

because

people seem to

the reasons

we went

Now

think

l

the health
about

erferon,

I'd po

t

known for well over 20 years as an anti-viral

c3ubs Lance that's

substance and one of the things this technology has shown which we
would never have knmvn, never have known, is -that, in fact,

there isn't

just one interferon, but there are a family of them, and there are
12 and maybe even more genes for interferons, and they're all
different, and they have different in vitro biological activities,
and they probably will all see clinical evaluation.
Antibiot

s is an area that we're vitally interested in

as a tailor-made case for the application of genetic engineering.
Antibiotics are the end product of a metabolic pathway.

This

pathway essentially converts Substance A to B to C to D and after G
may be the antibiotic.

You may have rate limiting steps ln the

production of this antibiotic and Substance B may not be produced
in a large enough quantity.

You can literally put in a thousand

genes for B, or you can accumulate large amounts of these intermediates and use them for chemical modification to create new types
of antibiotics.
This technology also allows you to do things that
evolution has not yet had time to get to.

Again, in the case of

antibiotics, nature has only had time to look at two or three,
pass
1

four, amino ac
penic

as a nucleus for a family of antibiotics

lins or cephalosporins.

There are 20 that she hasn't

had time to look at yet, which can now be looked at very quickly.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

What timetable do

ive to the

availability of this biosynthetic insulin?
DR. JOHNSON:

Well, it's available now, because as I

indicated, it's in broad scale clinical trial.

What you're really

asking, I think, is when can we predict a requlatory agency will
-13-

approve it.

I find that

to

but we

that it's likely that it will be
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

1

1982.

You

could be

now based upon the clinical research that s been

s

on-going'?
DR. JOHNSON:

The c

res

would

no

reason why it could not be
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Cos

factor

sent

available and this new biosynthet
DR. JOHNSON:

Cost

more expens

t

precis

when

will eventually be compet
that will be.

As with any new

any new

'

to be.

up is more of a problem

seal

t's not

have an

unlike a

the end

step synthesis and 10%
compound of
market

years

and the

9 %

s may be a

will come down.

Al

s

under constant deve

s

lar

of development.
we

Mr.
to

v

ilence

evolves at least from state

DR. JOHNSON:
l-idV

I

rev

!J ('

T

J_

er·y

L

tant

the fact that
ion downward, and as

s ago,

e
-14-

8%

of the Recombinant DNA research in this country was excluded from
the

~u

s, and risk assessment programs have continued under the

el

guidelines,

and~

ln fact,

's my personal opinion that,

the area of infectious diseases then

e who were
had been involved ln the orig
not even have existed.
ble fashion.

ization of the guidelines, they might

But I think the scientists behaved in a sensi-

We did have a moratorium.

and I think they've been complied with.

•

more

We did develop guidelines,
I don't think they've serious-

ly inhibited the development of the technology .
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

In terms of State intervention, what do

you foresee?
DR. JOHNSON:

I would hope that we would not see any

because I don't really think there's a need for it.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

You feel that all precautions are being

taken voluntarily, as Mr. Kiley indicated, by the industry, and
therefore, state regulation is not necessary at this time.
DR. JOHNSON:

I do.

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
Johnson?

Fine.

I would like to welcome Assemblyman Pat Johnston, who is a

member of the Health Committee.
DR. HERBERT WEISSBACH:

I

Any further questions of Dr.

Thank you very much,

Dr. Weissbach.

Thank you, Mr. Torres.

I'm Herbert

Weissbach, Associate Director of the LaRoche Institute of Molecular
Biology, which is part of the Hoffman-LaRoche Research Center.

I'd

like to thank you and the Committee for giving me the opportunity to
participate in this mornings discussion.
s to concentrate on another
application of recombinant DNA technology, and that is specifically
Interferon.

I'm assuming that there may be a need for some background

-15-

so I'd like to give a brief h

tori

n go

0\l

into the production and the status

CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Could

mike, please?

DR. WEISSBACH:

I'll be us

might be clearer to work off s

s

s' so

to

s

Let me start off by just giving a very s
which is a protein with ant
animal cells.

of
lS

The early work on

secreted
s

ago, and two of the major

at the

this sl

Ko

, Isaacs and

stud

actual discovery of Int

20~

5

The
that were

being done on the events that
animal cell, and I'll just schemat
shown on

When a v

s sl

cell, there lS a
les very rap

As a

icles are formed; and
er number o

released--the

the cell and then can be used
result, also, that the cell
often

s.

It was noted some ?

infected with a virus,

s

substance and this substance lS shown tn lnterfere Wlttl the process
f

viru

mult

on

)

for this material.

And needle

have a natural

occurr

were then

ed to

to
-

6

compl

the situation

to be a

shm,.m

Of cour

<>l

there was not one, bu

ou

c

A

hown on the

actua ly three major clas es
accord

and

is produced

connect

e blood cells.

lide,

~here

arc

are called

to the cell that produces the material.

from the buffy coat of the

arne much

Leukocyte comes

Fibroblast interferon

tissue cells of fibroblast, and immune

interferon comes from eel s, lymphocytes, which are part of the ant

•

body system.

And to further complicate the matter, leukocyte inter-

feron is composed of 12 or more interferon spec
which, to put

more closely-related
Dr. Rutter will
more

a specific protein.

s'

T

means that there are 12 or
erferon,

As shown on the bottom of the slide, the initial

s were done with interferon, produced either by
t, and they were indicative that interferon

leukocytes .or

possess anti-viral and
as descr

another way, and

e that could be used to make

the

enes

critical stud

scuss

s, that is, 12 or

-tumor activities.

However, studies

here were limited by the amount of interferon and the

of the interferon that was used for these studies.
mo t of the cl

studies, less than one percent pure interferon
ed the conclusions that could be

was used; and this, of course, 1
reached from these

For instance,

es.

s is really a natural for recombinanct DNA technology,
and LaRoche was particularly

erested in this process, that is to

interferon by recombinant DNA technology.
some of

Mainly because

LaRoche's scientists have been involved in interferon research

for more than 10 years and recombinant DNA technology is being done
at LaRoche Institute of Molecular Biology, several years ago a
program was initiated to accomplish this and then three years ago,

-17-

Roche initiated also, a scientific

, that Tom Kil

mentioned, with Genentech to facil

lon of

n

by recombinant DNA technology.
Let me go through now the

I had

Dr. Rutter would have given the basic sc
try to go through this very

that

before, but I'll

ust

We'll use a human

as an example here, and the old way was to take the cell which
contains the gene or in the case of a leukocyte, the genes, to
duce interferon and induce the cell to make
a virus.

, expose

The interferon is secreted from the cell and then one

could theoret

l

purify the interferon

with this procedure was that:
of white blood cells,
interferon, and (3)

(2)

(l)

Th

e

l

'shard to

amounts

the cells would

the purificat

a lot of

of these small amounts was

very difficult and especially

the fact that what

produced was a mixture of a dozen or more
species pure was practically

to

ss

with a long-extended effort.

could be done
to

lS

the leukocyte make the

, but to

gene to

organism that would produce

And that'

technique of recombinant DNA

des

start out with one gene,
basically, what is done is that

's moved

a vector

s

plasmid that no¥7 contains the interferon gene and the gene can be
obtained in one of several ways.

The vector can then be

organism such as the E.Coli, shown here, and
organism now

has the

grown, fermented, and

erferon
l

- 8-

s is a
the organ1sm

be
es

I !1

i

, you can r;r•ow

v

c;

t:iTHOUfltS

Secondly, the
be eng

properly to

's much eas

can

amounts of interferon, and

to isolate the interferon.

In addition, what can

done with one gene, can be done with all 12 genes or more, so that

2 d

you end up

cells,

now capable of

a

erferon.

spec

the end of last year, it was possible to take one of
erferon gene, and extensively

these cells, one clone

to produce large enough amounts

and work out a

could consider clinical

pure interferon that

was obtained for Phase I studies and

of this year,

a tentative clinical timetable is shown in the next slide.
began

In

s.

What

January called Phase I studies, and there was one spec

of interferon produced by recombinant DNA technology.
purpose of Phase I studies is s

of blood levels do you

to define the safety of the drug,

when you give the drug to patients.
has been obtained to start Phase II

Very recently,

at efficacy, and we'll

s which are

the Phase II study.

that Phase III s

lS

there are no
that new

And

scuss the diseases
all goes well,

es may initiate sometime in 1983; and
ications, the anticipated timetable is
be in 1984-1985.

stress that this is a tentative schedule.
real

And the

, and very important, pharmacology--what

what dosages can be g

1 be used

s

But I'd like to real
The clinical studies are

at an early stage and many factors could certainly influence

s t

CHAIRMAN TORRES:

And once this is available on the market,
-19-

what kind of message will the beautiful ads the
in Medical Economics and other physic

companies

magaz

s tell that

of what this drug will do?
DR. WEISSBACH:

I will attempt to at least des

be

diseases that are going to be tested during Phase II and Phase III.
And this a partial
cies~

st and includes

types of mal

breast, lung, colon, lymphoma, and
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

myeloma, and ...

Cancer of the breast, cancer of the

and cancer of the colon ...
DR. WEISSBACH:

Yes, exactly, and some viral diseases:

Herpes Zoster, Herpes Keratitis, an eye

ect

, chronic hepat

B will all be tested during Phase II

s for

, and the

the results of Phase

Phase III studies will hopefully

I

extend them if possible.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

categories-

Now, under the

Zoster, Herpes Keratitis, and

is B- at nresent there is no
is that r

pharmacological remedy for those v
DR. WEISSBACH:

s is caused

to be investigated?

lS

were

I can understand

sm,

the same

virus, that causes Chicken Pox;
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

l

s Zoster, to my knowl

there is a drug that is used.
is not adequate treatment.

s Kerat

ones.

There are not

?

B,
s

e
concern

the

Hhich a large portion of the population is coming up with.
DR. WEISSBACH:

Chronic

health problem throughout the world.

di

virus to handle.

t'
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a ma or

There may be a hundred
is

people who are suffering from
a

B is real

s

v

lS

so these are obvious, I think, viral diseases to look into.
Okiiy, T'rJ

ju

namely that recomb

ze now.

ik

The last slide,

DNA has been successfully used to

interferon and what was not mentioned in one of the previous slides,
that a second form of leukocyte interferon is now in Phase I studies
while the first interferon is going to Phase II studies.

Clinical

studies have been initiated so with two clinical, with two leukocyte
interferons, and the Phase II studies will now determine whether or
not the material is really active as an anti-tumor or anti-viral agent.
And as mentioned before, if it

lS

clinically effective, a reasonable

timeable would be 1984 to 1985 for this to be a drug.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

When you say clinically effectively, does

that mean stopping the cancer of lungs, or colons, or breasts?
DR. WEISSBACH:

Yes, there are some guidelines that the

clinicians use, which I am not that familiar with in terms of the
amounts of regression.

For instance, if there's 50% decrease in

the size of the tumor, that is considered -- when you see that,
considered clinically effective.

's

With the viral diseases, there are

very often viral markings that you can look for, that are present
the patient who has the infection that you can see disappear if
the drug is effective.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
ln terms of genetic eng
DR. WEISSBACH:

What safeguards is Hoffman-LaRoche taking
and the work that you are doing?
I think this has come up before.

To my

knowledge, Roche, as well as all the other companies, have been
following the NIH guidelines to the letter since the beginning of
1976, and certainly have done that.

We have an Institutional

Biosafety Committee, we use the containment regulations, or follow
-21-

those that have been put forth by the NIH.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Thank you very much.

I'd like to welcome

Herschel Rosenthal, who is the senior member of the Assembly Health
Committee.

Dr. Rutter, welcome.
DR. WILLIAM RUTTER:

late.

Thank you.

My apologies for being

I think my objectives this morning are to discuss with you

something about the general principles of genetic engineering, of
bio-technology.

I'd like to offer a few examples of how universities

contribute to the development of this field and finally mention,
just in a few words, one additional evidence of the utility of this
technology in solving problems facing mankind.

Now with respect to

the issue itself, genetic engineering, I thought it was easier to
use slides as well and first start with the DNA molecule.
You know the magic that is found in all living organisms
is contributed by proteins, that is to say, proteins do the work of
the organism, and they contribute to the metabolism, how things are
digested and reconverted into the elements which make our bodies do
what is magical about our bodies.

Now genetics is the science which

deals with the capability of peroetuating this working system, that is
the protein system, and the genetic material then provides the
information which describes each one of those proteins and where they
occur and when they occur in the living organism.

In a human being,

there is somewhere between probably 20 and a couple of hundred
thousand different proteins, not all of them are known, but all of
them are encoded in one or a few molecules of DNA.
on this slide, DNA is a marvelous molecule.
season, so red and green, but

.:L"t~_§_...£__double

And as indicated

It's near the Christmas
str_g_n_Q~1=ID~.1~£\l.l!:

and

each strand is really related to the other strand in the sense that
-22-

one strand provides the information from which the other strand

0

could be copied.

And the DNA molecule is composed simply of four

separate chemical entities.

Those four separate chemical entities

are arranged in different orders along the DNA molecule.

In a human

being, there are 46 such molecules in each one of the cells, and
there are probably about ten billion of these four nucleotides arranged
seemingly in monotonous fashion, but that actually in precisely
regulated correspondence.

And the length of those molecules, each

one of those cells, has that number of chromesomes, they are called.
The length, total length, might be about a meter, about three feet,
but the molecule is so thin that you can't possibly see it.

So

there's ten billion entities all strung out in an extremely long set
of molecules, and they are present, as I say, in two copies.

Now

in order to be expressed, the particular gene has to copy the DNA,
and the term "transcribe" is used, much like transcription of a code
is used, and what happens is that a copy of one of those DNA strands
is made in a slightly modified structure, called RNA.

It's a similar

molecule, but only exists in a single strand and that molecule of
RNA then is made in smaller, sort of gene-size units, and that
molecule, interestingly enough, then is the one that is used to
translate the record found in the DNA into the proteins which are
found.

Now, the proteins that we digested are not used in fact by

the body,but are digested in the gut and they are digested to form
amino-acids, abbreviated down here on the bottom.

In fact, there

are 20 of these as indicated earlier, and the way the molecular coding
is changed from nucleic acid coding to the protein coding is via the
organization of codons, small units in which th~~~--- o.t:__ _!!'l_~~-~--!-~~r___l?~par_~y-~
units
are translated to a single amino - acid.
- - - --- -----------------------M·--- 00 00- 0
------· --- - - ~ -
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e ln every orp;anism

s

refers to the

em and all this can be manipubreeding.

And as you know, most of

the changes which have occurred for man-made uses have in the past
utilized these breeding purposes or occasional

•

organism,but most
reproduction, the
part

breeding.

ns of s

le

In breeding purposes, for sexual
srr.s that

that's important, is that the
of all, phys

ipate in sexual contact, are f

sometimes psycholog

mutat

ly compat

ly compat

and biologically compatible.

That is to say, the cells have to be able to interact with one another.
And in all of our logical systems, there is strong constraint on
sexual reproduction between

sms, such as to maintain species

Now the remarkable thing, though, is that no matter which
organism, whether

's man or

, the coding rules are the same.

The coding rules are precisely the same.

That is to say, a single

code that makes a given amlno acid ln a protein in a human, would
also make that same
yeast cell.
ln

ac

a protein ln a bacteria or ln a

Wherever you find l' +'-.

Now the only difference lS that

organisms, lower and small, is that some of these regulaaspects of the genes are quite different.

t

So you can't simply

a human gene into a bacterium and expect the bacterium to deal
with it;

doesn't.
, so now what

?

Genetic engineer-

ing is a mechanism for manipulating the genetic apparatus beyond the
class

confines of sexual reproduction or mutation.

And this can

be done at the cellular level by mixing cells that otherwise wouldn't
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be

sexual

That

and have the chromosome

0
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s

plants where plant cell
and the chromosomes can
there's been remarkable progress
produce

sms

characterist

s.
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research have on
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Well

the demons
chi a

l

copy.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR.

around.
unders
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be

elements
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our research
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do

absolutely in sequence in order by the

is det

the
codon .

tead,

But

nd

lS

on this slide, there are

sequences of DNA which have nothing to do

the f

protein and those have to be spliced out before it can be used as a
ic system.
human

we were to take out,for example, the gene for

So

from a human, and try to express

the middle of the human insulin gene

wouldn't work because
there

lS

a

bacteria,

entro , one of those intervening sequences which

would interrupt the cod
confuse it.

sequence of the gene and which would

That intervening sequence in human insulin has to be

eliminated before you can ut

ize it as a system for expression in a

a

Now, how does this work in bacterium?

The general strategy

for engineering other organisms for man's purposes resolves around
our

lity to use other DNA systems, incorporate in them genes from

higher organisms as has been mentioned by all three preceding speakers,
and there are several ways to do this.

You can incorporate the new

gene directly into the chromosome, but most people

currentl~

instead,

incorporate it into small DNA pieces which exist in most microsms, l

yeast and bacteria, and replicate independent

the host genome.

of

That is the genome which contains all of the

ion for coding for proteins of the host that contains the
chromosomes.
most

And what was discovered some time ago in laboratories,

California--at Stanford and at University of California

San Francisco--is that there was a means by which you could
introduce foreign DNA molecules into such--reproducing small DNA
part

les called e

virus particles which happen to infect

bacteria or plasmid which replicate independently, but aren't
-27-
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that has the recombinant, and
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have uome way or uelccting,

s is an example of how this is done
s operates

s has a

icator so that

an organism, and

Every one

can independ-

s particular plasmid has a

gene which makes the cell
or ampicillin and

the laboratory.

both resistant to pencillin
, another antib

Okay, now the

consequence of that is that any bacterium which contains that
will grow in the presence of those two ant
there exists

a c

s

lcs.

Now

the tetracycline gene where you can

introduce that foreign piece of DNA; and when you introduce that
foreign p

of DNA,

s the tetracycline gene such that

the organism no longer is resistant to tetracycline, but is in fact,
now sens

to tetracycline.

populat

of cells by just

your

a hundred

select those bacter
to tetracycline.
be

llion,

You, therefore, can select in huge
them out on plates and select
necessary.

In the bacterium, you'll

which are resistant to penic

lin and sensit

Others would be completely sensitive to both and

lled or would be resistant to both and you could grow them, and

those ones would then be the bacteria that you're interested in.

So

now the job, this kind of job, simply allows you to reproduce the
DNA, bat by itself that DNA wouldn't express the gene.

In order to

express the gene, you have to re-put in the bacterium the signals
from the bacterium, that is, the regulating part of a gene from the
bacterium, and connect those in some way to the codons that are
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Now as a f

evidence of the power of the technology and

an additional specific example, I want to turn to Hepatitis B, which
was mentioned by Dr. Weissbach as a possible disease that could be
treated by interferon; and I want to emphasize that this disease is,
in fact, a huge public health problem in the world.

•

At least 500

million

contract that disease and 200 million are carriers

in the world.

Now, aside from the disease itself,which can some-

times last several years, the virus is thought to produce hepatocellular carcinoma, that is liver tumors, which are the world's
most prevalent cancers.

Now the difficulty in studying this organism

prior to, in fact, two or three years ago was the fact that you
couldn't grow the organism outside humans and one species of chimpanzee.

You couldn't grow it in tissue culture.

very d

Therefore, it was

icult to study; it's impossible to make a vaccine.

With

the advent of recombinant DNA technology, it was possible to study
the organism and indeed great progress has been made toward the
development of the vaccine.
by Hepat

Ordinarily, when a human is infected

is B, the liver produces virus particles, these large

ones, some of which look 1

donut structures and then there are

two other small particles,

s one and the long

lamentous

icles

which are produced in huge excess, and they contain only the surface
of the v

and not any DNA and recently scientists have shown that

these particles can themselves be used as a vaccine.

They're isolated

from the serum of carrier patients, but the problem is that they're
expensive and the total amount that would be available is extraily limited.

So the general aim then was to try to use Vlrus

genes to produce the same protein that is ln those surface particles
to form a vaccine, and my collegues and I were able to clone this
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Dr. Rutter:

's excellent for publ

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR.

lS

s

RUTT~R:

that?
lows the research to be carried

level and for the fruits of that research to be

out at a
transferred to the

use as rapidly as possible.

CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Do you think there oughL not to be a

ion between the

s

policy.

DR. RUTTER:
be a s

sector and the academic sector?
There is a separation and there always will

ion between the

and public sector, but I believe

that there should be easy communication between the two of those
groups; and

tances where it is to public good for rapid trans-

fer of technology to exist, then this should be facilitated in order
to accomplish these goals more rapidly.

I can only say that had that

not existed during the inception of the development of this new area
of science,

is no question that

er seven years

tead of 20.

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
the

s utility would have occurred

You don't think that the influence of

sector upon the academic sector might have a negative
t?
DR. RUTTER:

soc

We're

a situation where one sector of a

s on another, there are effects; but in this particular

case,

my view, the good to society far exceeds any dangers which

occur and I say as a member of the scientific committee that the
perquisites
lS

that community and its responsibility in the universities

jealously guarded by lts professors and will continue to be so

CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Do you think that the state ought to

ervene at this juncture to provide more regulatory vision in terms
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of avoiding potential dangers or at least
terms of regulation?
DR. RUTTER:
legal intervention.

No, I do not,

any necess

The processes

technology is occurring are adequate

covered on the nat

and are adequately considered by the var
ln the universities already.

leve

s councils

After

s been a

of transfer of technology, not so much
that have been developed

unlvers

slcs area,
handle

of problem.

Universities have

developments

, al

the past have

s

and also have

aided our country.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
to call on

1

lemen.

Thank you

Lennett,

s

for the State Department of Health
Director of the
Inst

of

s of Health and

Lennett.
DR. EDWIN LENNETT:

to
ome

myself so that you can
remarks I'm go

to make.

ef of the V
Division of Laboratories and Chief of the
Deputy Director of what was then
the Department of Health Services.
consultant to the Divis
T

J..

of

start out
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Bio~Med"ca·1

Section and a

conference was held and the consensus was announced through a letter
pulJlished in Science, there was considerable surprise and even
astonishment on the part of people in infectious diseases, in
epidemiology, immunology, because they felt that if there had been
more

inpu~

there would not have been any ground for raising many

of the scenarios which have been raised, and I should like to provide
a little background for that.

•

We did have behind us a long tradition of handling dangerous pathogens 1n the laboratory.

Over those years there has been

developed, as it were, a code of how you do things, knowledge which
has not necessarily been written down, but was passed down through
the universities by a preceptor system, which in my estimate has
long since disappeared; and when I finally finish some of my academic
colleagues may be incensed at my criticisms.
NIH guidelines represent

In any case, to me the

what has been done for many, many years

and for the first time has been codified and put into a format which
everybody could understand and which should be followed.
You ask me about the public health implications of genetic
engineering.

I would divide the possible potential hazards into two

sections, one which would deal with the human element, and that in
turn is a matter of education and training, and the second 1s physical
containment.

With respect to the former, I might go back and point

out that human error is inevitable, and we had an instance of that
not too many months ago in the Southern part of the state when a
mislabeled virus was used in some of the experimental work.
know how we'll ever obviate that kind of an error.
at any time.

It also occurred in the past.

I don't

This could occur

The same institution

some years back, when a virus which was labeled with one name,
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s

demolish-

tuberculosis; the

1s, a highly pathogenic fungus

lethal

because immed

complet

that hospital were two highly pathogenic

some amount.

sms

had an

Well,

years when the Veteran's Administrat

the Los

Ho

e.

happened,so far as we know,
ely after the demol

ion of that bu

ing the entire

area was sprayed with clorox solution and nothing, so far as we know,
eventuated in that

, so these laboratory accidents and even

disasters, I think, can be contained, can be helped.

I think the

federal NIH, which really summate everything we know about the
handling of disease incitants are adequate insofar as we know.

None

of the horrible scenarios that were devised and widely publicized
have come to pass, and I think we have reasonable evidence now that
the

lines are

have any problems.

If they are employed, we shouldn't
One quest

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
are

•

which ...

Yes,

in fact the federal quidel

s

, why is there some resistance on the part of this new
tration

Washington to deregulate those guidelines or at

least not to support them as positively as others have; and

that

1s the case, ought not states to look at what their role should be
terms of guidel

s for research within their boundaries.

DR. LENNETT:

I think if the guidelines are followed, but

I wanted to say the guidelines are followed, I can't see any great
lems arising except, perhaps, on the side of the human factor.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

And your recommendation in that area

would be?
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DR. LENNETT:

Well, I wanted to say that ln industry

there's a long record of hav

many

no

w

great hazard that I'm aware of; and

, I would 1

plead for a much better education of the

to

who go into

engineering from the standpoint of handling micro-organisms.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Mr. Rosenthal.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL:
about the NIH.

I'd just 1

It's been applied to all research at univers

anybody receiving funds to do research.
that do not rece

What about organizat

should follow the same ...

Well,

should but do

ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. LENNETT:

for myse

I would like to see, I'm

lS

What they do have are

of

ext ens
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genetics or departments of

So we have a whole

t

generation of graduates who have very l
handle dangerous pathogens or
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of Microb

as such, but in effect they are

medical schools today is no

now, I wou

as it used to be

Unfortunately, medical

not taught.

the cart

the horse ahead

Well, let me

like to see a return to class
taught.

s or

those funds?

DR. LENNETT:

if I may.

to ask a quest

of hol.<J to
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sease
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u

u

ist

-

does not know too

Therefore, it seems to me that

ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL
1

my ques

requ

ne

h()U]d

ply oui

'J

where

it should not also

to you,

1

trJe unJVCI' 1

e indus

whether or not
a;;

s fund

well , whether
the

experiment.
DR. LENNETT:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. LENNETT:

It should

ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL:
DR. LENNETT:

Does it?

Does it?

I don't know.

The industry

, Mr.

Gartland can answer that better than I.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROSENTHAL:

I don't know whether the NIH

regulations apply; and if they don't, then it seems to me maybe we
need something that says they have to.
DR. LENNETT:

Well, from what I heard this morning, they

were utilized by the industry.

The two speakers this morning, Mr.

Kiley and ...
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR. LENNETT:

They were voluntarily complying.

Voluntary, that's right.

CHAIRMAN TORRES:

On their own part and good faith.

They

are not appl

, as I understand it, unless they receive grants

from the Nat

Inst

compulsory in adherence.
DR. LENNETT:

es of Health, compulsory, jurisdictionally
Is that correct?
Well to me they only make good sense because

and put into outline or summarize somewhere in the
all of the things that use to be done in the medical
field; and when the Departments of Microbiology were overwhelmed by
cell biology aspects, this was no longer part so we need a whole
new set of guidelines so that people can be educated in this field,

-39-

and I think the

s

t

so far as I'm aware--I
handbook, a volume
Minnestota, as I recall,
these pre

hazardous

contained

the
CHAIRHAN

po

?

DR. JOHNSON:
all of us, and
Advisory

Ye
all

ee, the

of the U.S. Government
the FDA; for
not approve any
As I'm sure you are
lat
to see
jus

the

sl
other

We

DR.
Ro
been us

what
s

fort

warfare institution, they say

, the bio

ick,

structure ever built and yet over a

here was the

inest

20-year per

, there

some

00 cases of laboratory infection.

All right, but they were contained within those buildings; they never
out into the community.
which we

Also,

you follow the guidelines,

our own laboratory have been doing all these years; they
from what we've been doing.

are no di

In 1971, there was a

pandemic of a brand new disease, acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis,
which arose in Afr

up through Asia, in Europe, produced

llions of cases, and
and in Tokyo and
a s

those of us in Berkeley, in Singapore,

Houston, who worked with this agent, there wasn't

le laboratory

lOn.

So you can contain these things

you are aware of the techniques to be used.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

So you feel that the NIH guidelines are

more than adequate, if they are complied with?
DR. LENNETT:
CHAIRMAN
looking at improv
who deal

Yes, I do.

~ORRES:

And, number two, that we ought to be

or expanding the education of those people

these
DR. LENNETT:

sms?
Yes.

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
of the

Thank you very much.

of DNA Activit

DR. WILLIAM GARTLAND:

Dr. Gartland,

s.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name

lS William Gartland, and I'm Director of the Office of Recombinant
DNA Activities at the National Institutes of Health.
I'd like to speak briefly on the NIH guidelines for
recombinant DNA research and on their current status.

It was back

in July of 1973, that participants at a conference on nucleic acids
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be necessary.

And

July of 1973.

The Nat

s letter

on recomb
later in July of

DNA

974.

And

experiments not be undertaken.
ncertain" because there
a total

on all

said they asked that the D
Health establish an advisory
Recombinant DNA Advisory
that

cow~ittee

to

to do s

sess

to deve

proc

molecules

and

conference
the

C

er

conclud
prov

lCd

e

onference and held

ser

s of meet

s throughout 1975.

And in

recommended the first set of guidehe N

lines to the DirecTor oi

on these proposed guidelines
cow~ents

The N

then had a

JC

February of 1976; and following

made at the hearing and a reconsideration of some proposals

the RAC, the original guidelines were issued
Major revisions of these guidel

June of 1976.

s were issued ln December of 1978,

January and November of 1980, and

July of 1981.

And this history

of the guidelines is extensively documented in a series of volumes
ent

led ''Recombinant DNA Research" which has been published by the

NIH and is available from the government printing office.
Now, the guidelines themselves, specify safeguards to be
used in the course of experiments and these safeguards are provided
by levels of physical and biological containment.
ment rel

s f

t of all, on a set of standard laboratory practices.

And secondly, on spec

procedures, equipment, and laboratory

tallations that provide phys
and the experiment.

barriers between the investigator

Physical containment is divided into

levels designated P 1, P 2, P 3, and P 4.
level of containment, spec
techniques.

Physical contain-

four

P 1, which is the lowest

s the use of standard microbiological

The P 2 level adds additional laboratory practices and

the use of containment equipment such as biological safety cabinets
for certain laboratory manipulations.

The P 3 level requires special

engineering design features and physical containment equipment.

At

the P 3 level, there is a requirement for negative air pressure,
which means that air flows into the laboratory from the adjacent
corridors and is discharged outside of the building and is not
recirculated within the building unless it has been filtered.
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agreed to pose no novel hazards and are exempt from the requirements of
the guidelines.

These exemptions apply, first of all, to recombinant

DNA molecules that are not

organisms or v1ruses.

when the DNA is being handled merely as a chemical.

In other words,
The second

exemption is for recombinant molecules that consist of DNA segments
from a single source.
a single DNA molecule.

And this is cutting and pasting back together
The third exemption is for so-called self

cloning experiments in which an investigator takes DNA from an
organism, manipulates

, and puts it back into the same organism.

The fourth exemption is for recombinant DNA molecules composed of
DNA segments from organisms that exchange genetic information and
that appear on a list prepared by the Director of the NIH.

And the

fifth exemption is for certain other recombinant DNA molecules that
are found not to present a significant risk to health or the environment.

And many experiments involving three-host vector systems

including the E-Coli K-12 host vector system have recently been added
to this latter class of exempt experiments.
The NIH guidelines are mandatory as has been stated here
for

titutions and investigators receiving funding from NIH or

other federal agencies.

Section 4 of the guidelines, which is entitled

Roles and Responsibilities, specifies certain administrative requirements.

Among these requirements are that an institutional biosafety

committee must be established and that not less than 20% of the
membership of that committee must be people who are not affiliated
with the institution and who represent the interests of the surrounding community.

The guidelines also require a biological safety

officer if research is being conducted at the P 3 or P 4 level.
Under the administrative section, the guidelines specify
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Balt

code of practice and to start treating recombinant DNA research as
any other biological research would be treated.

And that's the basic

reason for their proposal.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR. GARTLAND:

And the lowering of containment?

The lowering of containment is not as

extensive as it would appear.

The proposal is that most containment

can go down to the P 1 level unless other guidelines such as those
that are issued by the Centers for Disease Control for handling
epidemic pathogens would recommend a higher containment level.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Do you think these proposals are going

to be accepted.
DR. GARTLAND:
bit.

Well,

l~t

me go on with the history a little

This proposal was considered by the Recombinant DNA Committee

in April of this year and as a result of that, a working group was
appointed to consider that proposal and other possible approaches
to modifying the guidelines.

And that working group met in June and

July and developed its own proposed revision of the guidelines which
was somewhat different than this Baltimore and Campbell proposal.
Then this latter proposal and background documents that were prepared
by the working group were considered by the Recombinant DNA Advisory

•

Committee at

s meeting on September 10 and 11, and the Committee

voted to publish for comment a proposal that now incorporates some
of the features of the working group proposal.

And the vote of the

Committee to publish this proposal for comment was 16 in favor and
three opposed.
I'd like to summarize what's in the proposal as it is now.
F

st of all, the proposal, as voted in September, would eliminate

the prohibitions, although it would add back admonitions regarding
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NANCY E. PfUND:

I'd like to thank you for the opportunity

to speak before this committee.

I am currently a business school

student, but I have been involved in the recombinant DNA issue for
several years now as a research associate at the Stanford University
School of Medicine and I've also been a consultant to the State's
Berkeley.

Hazard Alert System

I have some familiarity with both

the regulatory issues and the specifics of this particular technology.

•

I'd like to talk today about the challenge before the State
now ln terms of regulation and whether or not there is a role for
state regulation.

I think this is a particularly important issue ln

light of what Dr. Gartland has just described in terms of the dismantling of the apparatus or the possible dismantling of the federal
apparatus.

Before I go into a particular issue of regulation, I'd

like to just briefly talk about the benefits and
nology.

sks of the tech-

We have heard this morning about the vast potential that this

technology can bring in the field of health.

And the field of

wasn't mentioned, but it's another area where we're
looking for benefits.
toward useful appl
stud

I think that the progress that has been made
ion and the development of risk assessment

s have really been constructive in developing this technology

ln a safe, appropriate manner.

However, I think that there is some

drawback to the constant image that this technology has in the media,
the papers, and that is that there is one constant breakthrough
after another.

And I think that a tragic example of this is about a

year and a half ago when Biogen announced its interferon accomplishments.
cancer.

After that happened, it was mentioned as a possible cure for
I talked to some interferon researchers, one of them at

Stanford, and when that happened, he received voluminous calls from
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will
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you need to
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Another
very much
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sk of autoimmune
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lar act
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and
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make

be

e
l'JTO

p

to insufficient emphasis on control and detection of potentially
adverse exposures."
regulation.

T

L

that this is a good t

to talk about

I think that compared to other technologies, this one

has been -- the people in it have demonstrated a very impressive
sensitivity to the need for cautious, safe development; and I think
we should commend people for that, but when a lot of people that are
involved in technology feel that this commendable record and the NIH
guidelines obviates the need for regulation, which it is feared will
only slow down progress in this very exciting new field.
think that this is necessarily the case.

I don't

I think that there is a

role for regulations and that it need not be burdensome.

Extending

the guidelines or some version thereof, to private industry, would
only formalize and standardize what has taken place on an ad hoc
basis, before.

The experience of other states, such as Maryland,

New York, and Massachusetts, shows that--and they have extended the
guidelines at either the local level or the state level--shows that
can be done and in these areas I have not seen the research come
to a halt, nor have I seen in the literature that their innovativeness
lS

threatened because of a state regulatory apparatus.

So regulation

can bring uniformity to controls in the industrial sector, and a
recent NIOSH study, preliminary study, looked at what industr

s are

doing on a voluntary basis and found that while their efforts are
well-meaning, they are not always efficient and some of the areas that
NIOSH felt needed work and needed uniformity in control included
env

, validation of culture inacti-

vation, and keeping of employee medical records.

So that this is

something that NIOSH is looking into now and there's no real federal
activity in this area.
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Dr.
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DR. GARTLAND:
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two-

2

ln technology should have a knowledge about the scientific base and
the benefits and risks, as well as the social and political implications of a new technology.

At the same time the second layer is

those that are developing the technology, entrepreneurs, academic
industrialists should also have a familiarity with what the public
policy concerns are, that are spawned by their innovations.

And I

think that the reason we need this, this two-level approach, is
because genetic engineering is a very important technology, and at

I
the same time it's very controversial.

The violations of the guide-

lines, the patent rules, the brisk competition that we hear about
are just a slice of the debate.

The religious groups and environmental

groups, unions, that have really called for much more profound
discussion of just how·we're going to develop this technology and
should the public have some input, so that in some ways, state action
can represent these other interests and make sure that there's an
appropriately-paced development and not one that ignores or minimizes
risks, or tries to patch them up rather than prevent them.

And I

think that in closing I'd just like to say that private industry,
far from being hamstrung by state regulations, can enjoy significant
gains from increased public acceptance, credibility, customer approval.
I think that there is a role for establishing credibility with your
potential, your future customers; and state regulation and a real
cooperative development of this technology will really keep biotechnology corporations in a positive light with the public, rather
than a negative one.

And, also, at the same time, will enable them

to keep up with public preferences in product development.

And so,

I think, that ...
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Why don't we have some responses from
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them since we have them here.

Dr. Johnson or Dr. Weissbach from
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former

agree
s

Hrote

that the concept of c

by press conference was not a

to do for some of the same reasons she suggested.
similar sort of criticism at a meeting

se

And I made a

in Rome several weeks ago,

and I'll be glad to provide you with a copy of my remarks on that
ect.
Where that's happened is when the young entrepreneurial
companies ...
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR. JOHNSON:

What month were they published?

Pardon?

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR. JOHNSON:

Excuse me.

What month of the New England Journal?

I don't remember off-hand, but I'll supply

you with a copy of that as well.
But where this has happened though, it's really been the
young entrepreneurial companies, not the well-established companies
that have been in business for many years and they have somewhat
different motives for this, I believe.
She also mentioned the problem of air sampling and validation,
things of this sort, and the manufacturing data that we have to supply
the F.D.A., for example.

We validate every tank, in terms of the fact

that we can prove beyond any reasonable doubt that we killed every

I

organism in that tank.

We do have very severe air sampling around

all the tanks containing recombinant organisms.

We've been

doing

-scale fermentation of recombinant organisms now for over two
years, and we have yet to detect an organism that got out of the
tank.
I think her point was that people who have not had as much
experience as we have had might not do it the same way, but my
feeling is that the F.D.A. will insist and other regulatory agencies
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will insist that they do that.
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CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Alright, but one last question, and I

life organism developed to eat up oil spills.

My very simple

question is, what happens when the organism is full?
DR. JOHNSON:

The organism is so designed that it would

die.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

•

DR. JOHNSON:

So it's like ...

Now, let me raise one other point as well .

Some of these other issues are under active consideration.

For

example, there is a presidential commission of biomedical ethics,
and this is the same commission that considered research utilizing
prisoners and fetal research and developed federal guidelines ln
this area.

And they are actively considering, at the request of

three different religious groups, the biomedical ethics as it applies
to man.

And they have not yet issued their first report, although

it's my understanding that a draft of that report has been prepared.
But it is under active consideration.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
Mr. Kiley respond?

Dr. Weissbach, do you want to respond or

You're not necessarily required to; it's just

you feel the urge to.
DR. WEISSBACH:

Well, actually Dr. Johnson mentioned many

of the points that I wanted to bring up.

I'd just like to say that

these discussions among industry, academia and the government took
place in New Jersey, and the basic question that had to be decided-was there a significant potential risk, and I think that's what you
have to decide.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:
DR. WEISSBACH:

That's right.
And I think in New Jersey, it was decided
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BACH:

Y

k versus a potential risk, and the instances you are giving arc
known risks.

In the case of recombinant DNA technology, there

lS

no

known risk, as has been brought up time and time again; and the
potential risk agaln appears very, very slight.

So slight that most

scientists feel that it should not be handled any differently than
other biological research which has not been regulated.
MS. PFUND:

Can I just make a point?

CHAIRMAN TORRES:
MS. PFUND:

Absolutely.

I think that what you're getting at is a lot

more important than just risk and benefit.

I think it has to do

with the people's perception of technology and how useful it is,
and yet what risks there may be in it.

An experience I had a few

years ago, just in the leadership of the California State Federation
of Labor on this subject was instructive.

There I found a real

enthusiasm for this technology and for some of the products and
processes that it might bring; and yet at the same time, individuals
from various unions wanted to make sure that the mistakes of previous
technology were not repeated.

That, whether it's potential or real

risk, that there was some effort made to prevent unnecessary exposures
and to record and document the history of human exposures.

So that,

I

The

that that's not just confined to a labor audience.

people in California really are sensitive to human, environmental,
ethical concerns and want to make sure that there's some mechanism
for those concerns to be represented in the development

of a new

technology, and I don't think that that's the same as being antitechnology.

I don't think so at all.

I think that people are looking

forward to the benefits and that these companies will be looked on
with favor when the actual products come out.
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fact, word gets out that the

federal government is now, you know, turning it back to the states,
as they are doing with everything else, then

we ought to take

a look at, here in California, as to what the federal government is
not going to provide

terms of some s

s to these

regulations.
Dr. Lennett.
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ee

about some of
are a l

loose with the truth on occasion; and if you go far enough you'll
finrl thQt there

~rc

other considerations which have not been ment

Now, one of these, for example, that E. Coli produces mening
neonatal meningitis.
common.

Now that's a rare disease,

s,

isn't very

And Robbins down at the Bureau of Biologics investigated

some of these cases, and much to their surprise, they found that

s

was E. Coli, but it had an overcode derived from Neisseria Meningo-

•

coccus .

In other words,

was recombination in nature.

So this

wasn't mentioned; it was just that E. Coli is the villain.

It

became a villain only because of recombination in nature.
CHAIRMAN TORRES:

Well, we also found out just recently

almost a year ago, during the DBCP hearing that we conducted in
Fresno, that DBCP is created naturally, as well as artificially.
it was an interesting combination and comparison as well.
Any further questions?
I'm deeply appreciative of all of the participants, and
we will hope to be in contact with you again as we pursue what we
feel the solution ought to be.
Thank you very much.

This hearing's adjourned.
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INTRODUCTION
DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, governs
functions of all life on earth. It is
central r
for the information that each species
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ion
human mothers. And some of the prate
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Recombinant DNA research and use of these products, are
go
on in public and private laboratories in various
places in the United States and
reign countries. Many
concerned scientists are
arful that without stringent
controls, serious risks exist. Because of the risk, the
National Institute of Health has prohibited some recombinant
DNA experiments and restricted others.
The immediate issue now
re the California Legislature
is whether state action is necessary to offset a decreasing
fe ral regulation and overs
of rDNA uses.
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e because
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during their lives. Some of these s stances have
commercially valuable. A number of dif
ent
have learned to use microcultivating populations of
designed to enhance their
Applied genetics can play
speed, efficiency, and product
systems. It permits the man
at
the micro-organisms' genetic mat
characteristics. Genetic eng
er
industry, but a technique used
allows the researcher to modi
the ce11. The population of a ter
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The pharmaccut iced

ndustry has been the rirst to take

advantage of the potentials of applied molecular genetics.
Ultimately, it will probably benefit more than any other,
with the largest percentage of its products depending on
advances in genetic technologies.
The domestic sales of prescription drugs by U.S.
pharmaceutical companies exceeded $7.5 billion in 1979. Of
these, approximately 20 percent were products for which
fermentation processes played a significant role. They
included anti-infective agents, vitamins, and biologicals,
such as vaccines and hormones. G(?Iletics is expected to be
pa.rJ.!<::_lilarly ltsefu1 in the production of these pharmaceuticals
and biologicals, which can only be obtained by extraction
from human or animal tissues and fluids.
Two major factors triggered the use of genetics in the
pharmaceutical industry:
o

The biological sources of many pharmacologically active
products are micro-organisms, which are readily amenable
to genetic engineering.

o

The major advances in molecular genetic engineering
have been made under an institutional structure that
allocates funds largely to biomedical research. Hence,
the Federal support system has tended to foster studies
that have as their ostensible goal, the improvement of
health.

The products most likely to be affected by genetic engineering
in the next 10 to 20 years are nonprotein compounds like
most antib tics, and prate
compounds such as enzymes and
antibodies, and many hormones and vaccines. Improvements
can be made both in the products and in the processes by
ich they are produced. Process costs may be lowered and
even entirely new products developed.
Synthetic
ulin, growth hormones, antibiotics as well
as more exotic compounds such as interferon are seen as the
most likely short-term products. The following table identifies
projected domestic sales of products currently being developed.
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TABLE 1
PROJECTED U.S. MARKETS FOR
RECOMBINANT DNA PRODUCTS
($ MILLI
)
1982

Insulin (synthetic)
Somatotropin
Antibiotics
Vacc
s
Inter
Other Identified Substances

•2

3

39

0.

1.0

33

7
.6

35
1,135
260
430

41
3,140
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Chemic 1 Industry:
The chemical indus
currently utilizes the technology
of convert
coal to organic
icals, and a readily
available supply of coal exists. Coal-based technologies
will be used to produce a wide array of organic chemicals in
near
e. Never
less economic, environmental, and
technical factors will increase
industry's interest in
biomass as an alternative source for raw materials. Biomass
s been transformed
fermentation into organic chemicals,
and in theory, most any industrial organic chemical can be
produced by a biological process. Commercial fermentation
using genetically engineered micro-organisms offers several
advantages over current chemical production techniques.
o

The use of renewable resources: starches, sugars,
cellulose, and other components of biomass can serve as
the raw material for synthesiz
organic chemicals.
With proper agricultural management, biomass can assure
a continuous renewable supply for the industry.

o

The use of physically milder conditions: chemical
processes often require hi
temperatures and extreme
pressures. These conditions are energy intensive and
pose a hazard in case of accidents. Biological processes
operate under milder conditions, which are compatible
with living systems.

o

One-step production metho
micro-organisms can carry
out several steps in a synthetic process, eliminating
the need for intermediate steps of separation and
purification.
Decreased
lution:
cause biological processes are
i
y specific in the reactions they catalyze, they
o
r control over
products formed and decrease
undesirable si -products. As a result, they produce
pollutants that require management and disposal.

Food Process

Indus

The food processing industry comprises those manufacturers
that transform or process agricultural products into edible
products for market. It is distinguished from the production,
or farming and breeding portions of the agricultural industry.
Genetics can be us
in the food processing industry in
two ways: to design micro-organisms that transform inedible
biomass into food for human consumption or for animal feed;
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The Oil and Hazardous Materials Spills Branch of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), currently supports
research aimed at isolating organisms to degrade specific
chemical compounds. The best known research in this area is
that of Dr. Ananda M. Chakrabarty who engineered two strains
of "pseudomonas", each of which has the ability to degrade
the four classes of chemicals found in oil spills. Neither
of the pseudomonas strains engineered presents a threat to
human health.
EPA currently limits its support to research aimed at
selecting indigenous microbes, an area that has already
attracted some commercial research support. Commercial
firms are looking for large-scale markets, such as sewerage
systems, or commonly occurring smaller markets, such as
gasoline spills and common industrial wastes.
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REGllU\TTON Of GENETTC ENGTNEERTNG
~
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Although no evidence exists that any harmful organism
has been created by molecular genetic techniques, most
experts believe that some risk is associated with genetic
engineering. One kind is relatively certain and quantifiable - that of working with known toxins or pathogens.
Another is uncertain and hypothetical - that of the possible
creation of a pathogenic or otherwise undesirable organism
by reshuffling genes thought to be harmless. These may be
thought of as physical risks because they concern human
health or the environment.
An example of "physical risk" associated with genetic
engineering, compounded by inadequate security measures,
mishandling of products, or apparent impropriety by research,
was demonstrated last year at the University of California,
San Diego. A violation of the recombinant DNA safety rules
led to the wrong virus being cloned. Whether the virus,
whose cloning was prohibited by the National Institution of
!1ealth (NIH), was accidentally cloned, or intentionally
cloned, is unclear. But the possibility of accidental
cloning can occur. Adding to this drama, was the theft of a
bottle of rabies vaccine from the biology laboratory by a
person, or persons unknown, who was objecting to recombinant
DNA research. The rabies vaccine was left opened in a public
place for 24 hours before it was recovered. Fortunately,
there was no hazard to human health as a result of this
situation.
The issue of whether or not to regulate molecular
genetic techniques - and if so, to what extent - defies a
simple solution. Perceptions of the nature, magnitude, and
acceptability of the risks differ drastically. Approximately
6 years ago, when the scientific community itself accepted a
moratorium on certain classes of recombinant DNA (rDNA)
research, some scientists considered the concern unnecessary.
Today, even though the physical risks of rDNA research are
generally considered to be less than originally feared, some
people would still prohibit research.
There has always been an attitude that scientists are
qualified to assess their own physical risk, since this
involves measuring and evaluating technical data. Subsequently,
they feel that regulation of scientific activities should be
left to the scientific community. However a ·ud ment of
e accep a 1 1ty o t at risk) can only be made by
society through the political process, since it involves
weighing and choosing among values. Scientists are not
necessarily considered to be more qualified to make decisions
concerning social values than other well-informed persons;
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re

continu
concerns over several basic issues
controver ial
at this point in time,
a st
of resolution.

0

Can the micro-organisms us
in genetic engineering,
even
controll
conditions, accidentally
esc e to
outs
environment? Would these
micro-organisms present a health hazard?

o

Can toxic or potentially toxic micro-organisms be
ace ental
cloned?

o

In the event of an accident caused by a molecular
genetic te
ique, and the micro-organisms involved
creates a
alth hazard, who assumes the liability?

•

Is it appropria e
State of California to now
ate regulat
s
apply to genetic engineering
activities within
state? Even though the physical risks
re less than orig
11
ared, is genetic engineering so
e today that no re
ations are required to protect the
alth and sa ty of
people of California?
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In recent years,

•

literacy.

has achieved widespread

Almost weekly, we read of new genetic
cancer cures, energy-saving
in

promising upcoming
, and increased agricultural efficiency.

contrast to the environment four years ago, when this

committee heard scientists talk more about risk than benefit, and urge
caution.
Of course, new knowledge has worked to lessen fears of biohazards
from this

, and much progress has been made towards

useful

Yet,

s climate, where enthusiasm about benefits

concern about

risks, presents a

and creates unrealis

expectations.

interferon researchers,

Cancer patients call

offering huge sums of money for a dose

the current scientific evidence for interferon's effectiveness in
many types ot cancer
-

.2
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the imminent
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children.
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Pfund

of
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efforts

found

in the areas of environmental
culture inactivation, and
medical records.

of

In the absence of federal action in these areas,

874 of the California

Code--the Workers'

to Know Law--

and enhanced.

be

comes from the

A second argument for

and localities.

In Boston,
up

example, ordinances sett
mechanis~s

and

, Massachusetts,
• governmental oversight,

between

research and

of other

and the government have

to halt

and that area is not

in any danger of

due to legislative action.

to a two-layered orientation.
that consumers and those not expert in a given
have a

of

and risks, as well as its social,
consists o

's scientific base,
, and economic implications.

those

(academics,

)

their innovations.
The

ustification for

literacy in the field

for the future.
, there is
violations

While news of benefits speaks to the power
much evidence of controversy.

researchers of the NIH guidelines,

The handful
disputed

research ties, landmark patenting rules, and the brisk
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corporate competition displayed increas

in media reports and Wall Street

indices represent just a slice of the debate.
organizations, and a host of other

groups, environmental
activists, for

have called for caution and have
take

of the
that

the corporate

rate of return on inves

A mechanism to foster communication
in and affected
confining.

the new genetic

Ordinances

not be

in

the oversight process by setting up

biohazards committees whose

composition reflects a wide range of
or something similar, would work in California
discussion.

involved

various

or not this model,
a matter for further

I mention it only to show that State action can have the effect

of educating on a variety of subjects to an
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of

and so foster

• far from

• I would like to
by State involvement, can
, consumer awareness

• An

issue to the
of the California State
There, I witnessed a

shared

in order to avoid the mistakes of
an enthusiasm for the recombinant
that i t might

Incidents like

feedback amongst workers, managers,
customers in order to establish a
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of Nancy Pfund
December 1, 1981
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5

of many--from labor to
enviable

ie in

this exciting field.

a technical leader

of

available now for leadership in
the

The

a responsible public policy

's

should not go unexercised.

To summarize, then, I would like to leave you with three
Biotechnology's current

image is

No technology is 100% safe,

the

DNA merit

attention.

with them

of their

)

can

risks of recorrbinant

Furthermore, even benefits carry
and we must strive to

the

and need not stand in the way of progress

Current voluntary

leave gaps in safety procedures

that formal standards could fill.

Other states and localities

have recognized this, and their innovativeness has not suffered
as a result.
(

The DNA

enough to require that widespread

is

education and involvement accompany its development.
lends credibility to the
• and fosters appropriate

•

• Thomas

, Stanford University
John D. Crawford, M.D.,
16, 1981, Vol. 305, No. 3, pp. 163-164.

3.

Recombinant DNA Technical Bulletin," National Institutes of Health, Spring 1981.
, page 63.

80 Vicente
Berkeley, California
(415) 845-7565

94705
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La Roche established a recombinant DNA Biosafety Committee. This committee
includes scientists knowl
vi~uals

representing the

technology.

le

n these techniques as well as indi-

, medical, and ethical aspects of this new

In addition, health officers from surrounding communities and

a scientist from a local university are members of this committee.

The

committee reviews and evaluates all Roche research involving recombinant
DNA to ensure that

'

involved personnel are properly trained, safety

precautions are followed, appropriate facilities are used, and that all
experiments meet NIH guidelines.

Thus, the current involvement that Hoffmann-la Roche has in recombinant DNA
technology and the specific application of these modern techniques in the
production of interferon arose from the research efforts underway for many
years at the Roche Institute. As a specific example, one scientist from the
Roche Institute has been carrying out research on interferon for more than
10 years.

Interferon was described in 1957 by Isaacs and Lindenmann who showed that
ce ls exposed to a virus can produce a substance that protects cells against
v rus infection (

t A).

It is now clear that there are three major

interferon (leukocyte, fibroblast, and immune) and that leukocyte
interferon actually is a group of 12 or more closely related proteins
(Attachment B).
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those listed in Attachment E.

ible using recombinant DNA tech-

clinically effective, it should

in sufficient quantities and at a

nology to produce this s
reasonable cost.

This research on interferon is i lustrative of several trends today in the
complex drug discovery and development process.

First, this program

provides an excellent example of how basic research and new technologies in
modern molecular genetics can be used for the development of new pharmaceuticals.

Second, the process

nvo ves the unique interaction of a

critical mass of scientists in a variety of disciplines who must work
together closely to achieve the desi
interferon are active at

~xtremely

goal.

Third, substances such as

ow dose levels so that new procedures

measurement and detection become necessary.

This presents a challenge

and often requires costly, sophisticated instrumentation.

In

whil
s i ve and

the research and

, the rewards to society are cons i derab 1e:

on, treatment and cure
quali

lopment process is complex,
the

many diseases; the enhancement of the

of human lives; and the containment of overall health care costs.

challenge before us is to stimulate the incentives for research and to
recognize that our scientific efforts represent a vital national resource.
We are encouraged by the positive interest of the California State Assembly
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in our research activities, for we bel eve that innovation and discovery
should be our common goal and active1

Thank you for this opportun ty to
important subject.

I hope these

l.

your
s have

nation
he 1

this

1.
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ATTACHMENT E

DISEASES BEING INVESTIGATED

Cancer

Ill

Viral

Breast

Herpes Zoster

Lung

Herpes Keratitis

Colon

Hepatitis 8

·Lymphoma
Multiple Myeloma
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THE SALK INSTITUTE

Appendix D

I know that in your wisdom as Chairman of this Committee you will
see the benefits of this science and find ways for the government of
California to take a leadership role for the rest of the world in
stimulating genetic engineering research and its industrial application.

~r~
~as

Salk
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ion in its new
form.l The National
Institute of Health
) , an agency within the United
States Department of Health and Human Services,2 has adopted
guidelines for recombinant DNA research.3 Essentially, these
guidelines prescribe safety procedures, and the biological
and physical containment procedures under which permitted
recombinant DNA research should be conducted. The guidelines
promulgated by NIH apply to projects supported by grants
made to non-Federal public institutes and private non-profit
institutes selected by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services for this research.4 However, the NIH guidelines are
not generally enforceable.5 Currently, there are no provisions
in state law which require any public agency to license,
regulate, or otherwise give special approval for research
projects utilizing recombinant DNA. There are no local
governmental attempts to regulate research utilizing recombinant
DNA.
The California Tort Claims Act (Div. 3.6 (commencing with Sec. 810), Title 1, Gov. C.)6 provides for
claims and actions against public entities and public
employees and bars tort actions against public entities not
within its comprehension (Hays v. State, 231 Cal. App. 2d
48, 49-50). In this regard, the University of California is
a public trust governed by a corporation known as the Regents
of the University of California (Sec. 9, Art. IX, Cal. Const.)
and, for the purposes of governmental liability, is a public
entity (see Sec. 811.2).
The California Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1963,7
a
the California Supreme Court abrogated the long-standing,
judicially-declared doctrine of governmental tort immunity (see
v.
,55Cal.2d211). In
--~'-o,_..

l

See Capron,
California

2

See 42 U.S.C.A., Sec. 203.

3

National Institute of Health, Guidelines for Research
Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 46 Fed. Reg., No.
126, at p. 34462.

4

See 42

5

46 Fed. Reg. No. 126, Sec. IV-B, at pp. 34475-34476.

6

All statutory references are to the Government Code,
unless otherwise indicated.

7

The act was enacted in six separate statutes (see Chs.
1681, 1715, 1682, 1683, 1684, and 1805, Stats. 1963).

n.s.c.A.,

Why Recombinant DNA?
973.

51 Southern

Sec. 2891 1.
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Thus,
due care, and a failure

A failure to exercise due care can be
in
various ways.
In a
field, such as recombinant DNA
research, expert
could be used to establish
standard of care.
a statute,
jury
se to a
Sec. 669, Evid. C.).
pre
California
research,
vlhich,
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Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 241-246, Mark v.
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"(l)
the statute,
ordinance, or
what
reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary
prudence, acting under similar circumstances,
who desired to comply with the law ...

* * *"

I

(Emphasis added.)

We note, however, that compliance with a statute or
regulation does not always lead to a holding that the person
is not negligent (Hubbard-Hall
Co. v. Silverman 340
F. ~402, 405). The defendant in a negligence
still exercise the care required under common law--that care
which would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence in
the same circumstances possessing the same knowledge.
We thus conclude that the enactment of NIH guidel
s
on recombinant DNA research into law would define the standard
of care required by persons or institutions conducting recombinant
DNA research. An act or omission which violates this law would
raise a rebuttable presumption of negligence.
Very truly yours,
Bion H. Gregory
Legislative Counsel
/) /i
J, ~ ~Jv__'~
By /,::;r{/1../~s.t.'>
Sandra Hughes
Deputy Legislative Counsel
A.

(1

By
Sharon
Deputy
:dse
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repeal Chapter 2.5
of Division 20 of
to genetic research.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 3549, Torres. Genetic research.
(1) Under existing law, there exist no provisions which
require any public agency to license, regulate, or
otherwise give special approval for research projects
utilizing recombinant DNA genetic research activity.
The National Institutes of Health, an agency within the
United States Department of Health and
Services, has adopted guidelines for recombinant
research. These guidelines prescribe safety procedures,
and the biological and physical containment procedures
under which permitted recombinant DNA research
should be conducted. The guidelines promulgated by
National Institutes of Health apply to projects supported
by grants made to nonfederal public
private, nonprofit institutes selected by the Secretary
Health and Human Services for this research. The
guidelines presently are not generally enforceable.
This
would enact the California Recombinant DNA
Safety Act of 1982 relating to such research.
The bill would require all recombinant DNA
research
out under the auspices
agency, or organization of the
to comply with the applicable N.LH.
would also specify that any civil or
that a person violated those
that the person failed to
created a rebuttable
of proof.
specify that compliance with
provisions of
California Recombinant DNA Safety Act
of 1982 shall not be construed to require disclosure of
trade secret mformahon without assurance of
confidentiality.
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